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Introduction
Cognitive control refers to the intentional selection of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors based
on current task demands and social context, and the concomitant suppression of inappropriate
habitual actions (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Common situations that require cognitive control
include: studying for an exam while resisting the impulse to check Facebook; having fruit instead of
dessert when on a diet; and being patient with one’s kids instead of yelling at them for spilling juice
on the carpet. Historically, there has been preferential interest in how cognitive control operates. An
influential model suggests that the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) represents rules or instructions
in workingmemory and that this information adaptively guides perceptual andmotor processing in
posterior brain regions, thus resulting in the selection of appropriate behaviors, and the suppression
of maladaptive habitual actions (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Bunge, 2004). Surprisingly, there has
been less focus on why individuals choose to engage cognitive control in the first place (Dixon
and Christoff, 2012; Botvinick and Braver, 2015). In this article, I outline a value-based framework
of cognitive control which suggests that: (1) individuals choose to engage cognitive control when
they expect that it will produce an emotionally valued outcome (i.e., a reward or the avoidance
of punishment); (2) the LPFC is a critical neural substrate involved in representing the value of
engaging cognitive control; and (3) the LPFC is organized along a rostro-caudal axis, with different
sub-regions contributing to different elements of the decision to employ cognitive control.
Cognitive Control and Emotional Value
A number of studies have shown that individuals are naturally disinclined to engage cognitive
control (McGuire and Botvinick, 2010; Dixon and Christoff, 2012; Botvinick and Braver, 2015). For
example, when given the choice between two tasks, individuals will reliably choose the easier task
(McGuire and Botvinick, 2010). It requires considerable effort to intentionally direct action, and
this may often be experienced as aversive. This has led to the idea that cognitive control carries
an intrinsic effort cost (Botvinick and Braver, 2015). Accordingly, individuals may only engage
cognitive control if they think that it will produce an emotionally valuable outcome that outweighs
this effort cost.
We examined this idea by offering participants the choice between engaging cognitive control
or selecting a habitual action, and varying the amount of money they earned based on their
choices (Dixon and Christoff, 2012). The results were striking: participants invariably selected
the habitual action when it was expected to yield an equal or larger monetary reward. In
contrast, participants frequently chose to engage cognitive control when it was expected to
result in a larger monetary reward than the habitual action. This suggests that the anticipated
emotional value of the monetary outcome was a critical factor influencing the decision of whether
or not to engage cognitive control. This finding complements other work demonstrating that
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reward incentives often lead to faster and more accurate
performance (Locke and Braver, 2008; Jimura et al., 2010;
Padmala and Pessoa, 2011; Chiew and Braver, 2013; Etzel et al.,
2015).
While it is clear that cognitive control and emotional value
systems do not operate independent of one another (Watanabe
and Sakagami, 2007; Pessoa, 2008; Dixon and Christoff, 2014),
the precise mechanism underlying their interaction remains to
be determined. I suggest that the brain flexibly creates temporary
bindings or associations between rules for action that support
cognitive control and the emotional outcomes that are expected
to be obtained from rule-use (Figure 1). When a rule becomes
associated with a high-value outcome, this may sharpen and
stabilize the rule representation in working memory (Etzel et al.,
2015), thereby enabling individuals to hold this information in
mind until it has successfully guided behavior. Thus, if a student
is deliberating between going to the movies or studying for an
exam, the student will be more likely to resist the immediate
pleasure of going to the movies if they focus on the causal
relationship between studying (which requires cognitive control)
and the desired outcome it will produce (a good grade). If the
student’s attention is merely drawn to the effort of exerting
cognitive control, they will be more likely to go to the movies.
Similarly, when parents use the phrase “because I said so” after
requesting their child to exert self-control, they should not be
surprised when the child does not comply, because they have not
provided the child with an incentive to invest the effort.
FIGURE 1 | Rule-outcome associations in the LPFC. Information about
rules may be first registered in regions including the posterior middle temporal
gyrus (pMTG) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC), while information about
rewards and punishment may be first registered in regions including the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), insula, and pregenual anterior cingulate cortex
(pgACC). This information may then be passed to the lateral prefrontal cortex
(LPFC) where it is temporarily bound into a rule-outcome association that
specifies whether engaging cognitive control is expected to result in an
emotionally valued outcome. Other value regions including the ventral striatum
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex may also interact with the LPFC in a
context dependent manner.
An important implication is that in some cases, individual
and group differences in cognitive control may be erroneously
attributed to differences in “cognitive” mechanisms (e.g., the
ability to hold rules in mind, reasoning, response inhibition),
when in fact it reflects differences in the perceived emotional
value of engaging those cognitive mechanisms. Furthermore,
there may be substantial individual differences in the types
of incentives that effectively motivate cognitive control—some
individuals may be more responsive to monetary rewards, others
to food rewards, and others to social praise, intrinsic motivation,
or the avoidance of punishment.
The Lateral Prefrontal Cortex and
Rule-Outcome Associations
Is there evidence that the brain flexibly creates temporary
associations between rules that support cognitive control and
the emotional value of expected outcomes? A number of studies
have provided indirect evidence for this idea, showing that
cognitive control related activation in the LPFC is amplified
by reward incentives (Kouneiher et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2010;
Jimura et al., 2010; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011). To directly
examine this hypothesis, we had participants perform a cognitive
control task in which they used one of two rules to respond to
stimuli on each trial, and earned one of two monetary outcomes
based on their performance (Dixon and Christoff, 2012). Using
fMRI-adaptation, we looked for any regions that were sensitive
to specific rule-outcome pairings. We found that the LPFC
exhibited precisely this effect. Notably, the relevant rules and
monetary outcome changed from trial to trial suggesting that
the LPFC was continuously forming and then dissolving such
associations in a flexible manner. In contrast to the LPFC,
other value-related regions including the orbitofrontal cortex,
anterior cingulate cortex, and ventral striatum were sensitive to
the expected reward outcome, but did not encode rule-outcome
associations. Recent theoretical work has suggested that the mid-
cingulate cortex may play an important role in determining
the value of engaging cognitive control (Shenhav et al., 2013),
however, the findings from this study favor the interpretation
that the LPFC is the critical region in determining when it is
worth it to intentionally direct action. This idea is consistent
with recent evidence demonstrating involvement of the LPFC in
comparing the value of different actions (Morris et al., 2014).
In particular, the LPFC has been implicated in “model-based”
decision making—the construction of an internal model of the
world, including the relationships between context, task-rules,
and anticipated outcomes, in order to decide between choice
options (Smittenaar et al., 2013; Buckholtz, 2015). Buckholtz
(2015) has convincingly argued that the LPFC’s capacity to
construct rule-outcome associations in a model-based manner is
a critical computation underlying adaptive social behavior.
How does the LPFC create rule-outcome associations? One
possibility is that information about rules and information about
reward/punishment is first registered in separate specialized
posterior brain regions, and then is passed to the LPFC which
creates a temporary association between this information within
working memory (Figure 1). Consistent with this idea, we
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found that the LPFC exhibited synchronized activation with
reward processing regions (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex, ventral
striatum, insula, pregenual anterior cingulate cortex) and with
rule processing regions (e.g., posterior parietal cortex, posterior
middle temporal gyrus) when participants engaged cognitive
control in order to obtain a monetary outcome (Dixon and
Christoff, 2012). Extending these findings, recent work has shown
that a frontoparietal network (including the LPFC) flexibly shifts
connectivity patterns with other parts of the brain from trial
to trial based on task demands (Cole et al., 2013). In line with
these findings, LPFC neurons do not exhibit an intrinsic tuning
toward a specific type of information, but rather, flexibly code
information that is currently relevant on a given trial (Stokes
et al., 2013). Thus, the adaptive coding properties and widespread
anatomical connections of the LPFCmay allow for the temporary
construction of associations between diverse inputs, including
rule and value information.
Emotion Regulation as Value-based
Cognitive Control
This value-based framework of cognitive control may provide
a new understanding of how the LPFC contributes to emotion
regulation. Emotion regulation often involves the effortful use
of rules or cognitive strategies in order to alter one’s emotional
state (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Gross, 2015). Traditionally, the
LPFC has been linked to the implementation of these strategies,
such as attentional distraction, reasoning about emotions, and
reinterpreting the meaning of events (Ochsner and Gross, 2005).
However, the LPFC may also play an important role in the
decision to initiate emotion regulation. Here are two examples
of how it may contribute: (1) it may be involved in determining
when emotion regulation is necessary by representing the value
of a current emotional state in relation to social rules (e.g.,
determining that it is not appropriate to feel/express anger
because one is currently at a work meeting); and (2) it may
be involved in determining the value of employing effortful
regulation strategies by representing the relationship between
a given strategy (e.g., reappraisal of an event’s meaning) and
a desired outcome (e.g., less anger). Thus, the decision to
instantiate emotion regulation may depend on the flexible
synthesis of rule-outcome associations. This perspective is
compatible with Gross (2015) extended process model of
emotional regulation, which emphasizes the role of second-order
valuation mechanisms in triggering the engagement of emotion
regulation strategies. The two examples noted above broadly
correspond to the identification and selection stages of Gross’
model, respectively.
The Hierarchical Organization of the
Lateral Prefrontal Cortex
Accumulating evidence suggests that the LPFC is hierarchically
organized along a rostral to caudal (anterior to posterior) axis
(Christoff andGabrieli, 2000; Koechlin et al., 2003; Petrides, 2005;
Bunge and Zelazo, 2006; Badre and D’Esposito, 2009; Christoff
et al., 2009; Dixon et al., 2014). I consider how this hierarchical
organization relates to the decision of whether or not to engage
cognitive control. The rostral LPFC (area 10), mid-LPFC (areas
9/46/45), and caudal LPFC (areas 44/8/6) are discussed in turn.
Cognitive control often operates in service of desired long-
term outcomes (e.g., studying over the course of a semester in
order to get an “A”). The rostral LPFC plays a role in meta-
cognitive awareness (Fleming et al., 2010; McCaig et al., 2011; De
Martino et al., 2013) and relational processing (Christoff et al.,
2001; Wendelken et al., 2008). It may contribute to the decision
to engage cognitive control by enabling individuals to reflect on
their thoughts and feelings, and to establish long-term priorities
by comparing the value of potential future outcomes. Consistent
with this, the rostral LPFC is recruited when individuals plan
steps to attain a future goal (Gerlach et al., 2014), choose to
avoid situations that may interfere with the attainment of future
rewards (Crockett et al., 2013), monitor progress toward a desired
future reward (Dixon et al., 2014), and select actions directed
toward future rather than immediate rewards (McClure et al.,
2004; Jimura et al., 2013). This region may work in concert with
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which is also involved in
representing the affective value of future scenarios (D’Argembeau
et al., 2008; Benoit et al., 2014; Gerlach et al., 2014). One
possibility is that the VMPFC represents the value of potential
future outcome, and the RLPFC contributes to the selection
of one outcome to pursue as a goal. Interestingly, meditation
practice is associated with increased gray matter volume in
the rostral LPFC (Fox et al., 2014), suggesting that this meta-
cognitive capacity to step back and reflect on thoughts (including
desired future outcomes) can be trained and improved.
Whereas the RLPFC plays a role in decisions regarding
overarching priorities, the mid-LPFC operates on a shorter
time-scale, contributing to the decision of whether or not to
employ rules to intentionally direct action at any given moment.
This decision depends on discerning whether the outcomes
expected from rule-use are sufficiently valuable to offset the effort
cost. Thus, a critical component is constructing rule-outcome
associations. Notably, our fMRI-adaptation study revealed robust
encoding of rule-outcome associations in the mid-LPFC (Dixon
and Christoff, 2012). Consistent with this, recent findings
indicate that mid-LPFC activation reflects an interaction between
the complexity of rules that are required to respond to stimuli and
the size of an expected reward outcome, and this neural response
correlates with individual differences in behavior (Bahlmann
et al., 2015). Furthermore, mid-LPFC is reliably activated in
studies of emotion regulation (Buhle et al., 2014), and may be
involved in representing associations between rules/strategies
(e.g., reappraisal) and desired outcomes (e.g., less sadness). The
function of the mid-LPFC may depend on transient interactions
with rule-processing and value-processing regions, and such
network interactions may depend on context. The ventral
striatum is activated during the anticipation of imminent rewards
and the opportunity to exercise choice (Knutson et al., 2001;
Leotti and Delgado, 2014), and may provide motivational signals
to the mid-LPFC that promotes the engagement of cognitive
control to obtain immediately available rewards. In contrast, the
opportunity to make progress toward a desired future outcome
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may engage cognitive control via positive interactions between
the rostral LPFC, mid-LPFC, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
and inhibitory interactions between these regions and the ventral
striatum (Diekhof and Gruber, 2010; Jimura et al., 2013; Van Den
Bos et al., 2014).
Once the decision to engage cognitive control has been made,
it requires that rules be translated into specific voluntary actions.
The caudal part of the LPFC is involved in this process (Koechlin
et al., 2003; Bunge, 2004; Petrides, 2005). The caudal LPFC
is strongly activated during the execution of actions (Dixon
et al., 2014), and facilitates the execution of context appropriate
actions over competing actions by representing sensorimotor
associations (Koechlin et al., 2003; Bunge, 2004; Petrides, 2005).
Thus, caudal LPFC activity reflects the embodied output of
the decision process—the behavioral instantiation of cognitive
control.
Conclusion
Considerable evidence suggests individuals will engage cognitive
control when they expect that it will produce a valued
outcome that outweighs the intrinsic effort cost—this may be
an immediate or future reward, or a desired change in one’s
emotional state in the absence of external incentives. The LPFC
contributes to this process, with the rostral LPFC representing
desired long-term outcomes, the mid-LPFC supporting the
flexible construction of rule-outcome associations, and the caudal
LPFC translating rules into specific voluntary actions. The LPFC
operates in the context of interactions with widely distributed
rule and value-related regions (Dixon and Christoff, 2012,
2014). Much remains to be learned about the mechanisms
underlying the decision to engage cognitive control, making this
an important topic for future research.
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